Intergenerational income mobility is lower in the United States than in Canada, but varies significantly within each country. Our sub-national analysis finds that the national border only partially distinguishes the close to one thousand regions we analyze within these two countries. The Canada-US border divides Central and Eastern Canada from the Great Lakes regions and the Northeast of the United States. At the same time some Canadian regions have more in common with the low mobility southern parts of the United States than with the rest of Canada, and the fact that these areas represent a much larger fraction of the American population also explains why mobility is lower in the United States.
The degree to which inequality is passed on across generations has been a longstanding issue studied by labor economists and other social scientists, at least since the late 1800s when Francis Galton famously conceptualized the process as "regression to the mean." But the issue has also risen to the top of the public policy agenda in many countries, particularly in the United States. In part, this reflects the fact that the influence of family background on child outcomes relates to one of the country's defining metaphors, the "American Dream." But in part it also reflects growing labor market inequality, and the increasing awareness that economic opportunity-the capacity of children to move up the economic ladder-may be more limited for those from relatively less advantaged families when inequalities of outcomes are greater.
The empirical literature addressing intergenerational mobility naturally looks to time series variation to highlight potential causal forces, and appreciate the influence of public policy. Our analysis begins with a brief review of economic theory to suggest that comparative analysis between countries may also have particular value. One of the implications to be drawn from a series of papers by Raj Chetty, Nathan Hendren and their co-authors, however, is that the tone of comparative research has changed. In particular, a lesson from Chetty et al. (2014) is that a within-country analysis of the United States is more relevant than many between-country comparisons because the variation-or lack of it-within national borders more appropriately highlights the driving forces and feasible policy options. Social choices in many other countries may be motivated by underlying values that Americans may not share, and therefore have little relevance to the conduct of public policy. Having documented considerable variation within the United States leads the authors to naturally explore the important causal role geographic mobility may play in promoting intergenerational mobility (Chetty and Hendren 2018a; 2018b; Chetty, Hendren, and Katz 2016) .
We begin with the premise that cross-country comparisons can complement withincountry analyses. A Canada-US comparison is particularly judicious, and in the two following sections of the paper we draw lessons from theory and highlight public opinion data to appreciate the underlying determinants of intergenerational mobility, and how they are perceived by the citizens of these two countries. Public opinion polls suggest that Canadians and American share basic attitudes toward inequality and opportunity, and toward the underlying drivers of upward mobility. If there is such a thing as the "Canadian Dream," it would look very much like what Americans say is the "American Dream." Differences in Canadian-American outcomes need not reflect different values, and this raises the possibility of learning more about the causes of economic opportunity, and appreciating the role played by institutions and policies.
Our objective is to offer a between and within country analysis of Canada and the United States by examining a menu of intergenerational mobility indicators estimated for each of about 1,000 small areas. The Canadian data we construct are described in the third section of the paper, and like the administrative data source used by Chetty et al. (2014) , are based on intergenerationally linked income tax files for a group of young men and women born in the early 1980s, and whose adult incomes are captured when they are in their early 30s. We place these Canadians in the American income distribution, and describe the landscape of economic opportunity over Census Divisions and Commuting Zones that completely tile these two countries. We should stress that our analytical sample is intended not to be the "best" possible data for the analysis of intergenerational mobility in Canada, but rather the "best" possible data for a comparison with the United States. The Canadian data we construct and use probably allow a more accurate comparison with the United States than any country-wide comparison that has been made in the literature to date: tax-based administrative data, used to define similar measures of income, and coming close to covering the total population of similarly defined birth cohorts.
The analysis and findings are described in the three remaining sections of the paper. We confirm the existing impressions from the cross-country literature that Canada is characterized by more intergenerational mobility than the United States, whether in terms of intergenerational income mobility, intergenerational rank mobility, or in terms of particularly relevant elements of the intergenerational transition matrix, like rags to riches movement and intergenerational cycles of low income. The border partially demarcates the most populous region of Canada-the Québec City-Windsor corridor-from the Northeastern seaboard and the Great Lakes region of the United States. In part, this reflects a greater degree of labor market inequality in these parts of the United States. But the other reason the national statistics suggest Canada is more mobile has to do with the fact that there is a high concentration of low mobility in the southern United States. While certain regions of northern Canada share this limited mobility and are more accurately grouped with these regions of the United States than with other parts of Canada, they make up a much smaller share of the Canadian population, and do not influence the national statistics to the same degree. Our findings suggest that inequalities between whites and blacks likely play an important role in understanding why the United States has lower rates of intergenerational mobility than other countries, in spite of public opinion polls showing that many Americans feel race is not an important driver of upward mobility.
Theoretical background
Alan Krueger (2012) , in his role as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, cited the positive correlation between income inequality and the intergenerational earnings elasticity across the rich countries-a relationship he christened as the "Great Gatsby Curve"-to motivate the possibility that rising income inequality in the United States will in the coming decades move the country in the direction of less social mobility. There is a case to be made that among the possible cross-country comparisons in the literature, the Canada-US comparison may be particularly apt. There are "small differences" in the way Canadians and Americans value and understand intergenerational mobility, and this may help to bring into relief important differences in the nature of labor markets and public policies.
Theory shows that differences in intergenerational mobility between countries may reflect differences in any number of structural parameters, some of which may be more open to policy influence in some national contexts than in others. Solon (2004; adapts the workhorse model due to Becker and Tomes (1986; 1979) and Loury (1981) to illustrate the challenges of making comparisons across time and space. A simplified version of the model in Solon (2004) -one that puts aside an explicit utility function reflecting the influence of parental altruism on child investments, and also the influence of the progressivity of government investment-is captured in the following equations:
(1)
e t = λe t−1 + t
where t indexes generations within a family dynasty, y refers to the logarithm of permanent income, h to human capital, which determines income (having a return ρ), and in turn may be determined by parental income if there are credit constraints in human capital investment, but otherwise determined by e, an unobserved endowment not influenced by family investment decisions, and mechanically transmitted across generations according to a first order auto-regression governed by parameter λ, the "inheritability of endowments," with being a random variable representing "luck."
1 Solon (2004) shows that in a steady state the population regression of earnings across generations has an elasticity β = (ρθ + λ)/(1 + ρθλ).
With perfect capital markets, that is θ = 0, the structure of labor markets and the institutions that determine human capital investment do not come into play, and differences in earnings mobility over time or across space reflect-in some loosely defined way-differences in populations and environments that imply differences in the nature and transmission of endowments. But if capital markets are not perfect, then differences in the returns to human capital, and the causal role of parental income determining the amount of human capital, must also be part of the story. Inequality may be higher in some places, as reflected in higher values of ρ, but individual behaviour or public investments easing θ may be countervailing forces. Becker et al. (2018) , and specifically Solon (2004) , add other dimensions relevant to cross-country comparisons, permitting parental altruism (that is, tastes and values), the progressivity of government spending, and substitutability between private and public investments, to also influence the intergenerational elasticity.
Countries may occupy different positions on the Great Gatsby Curve for a whole host of reasons associated with the inheritability of endowments, access to education and other sources of human capital, differences in labor markets, and for the simple reason that they make different choices reflecting different social objectives, or different perspectives on the 1 Clearly, this is a very simplified framework, but it can be easily extended. A child's adult income may be influenced not just by his or her human capital and endowment, but possibly directly by parental income, which might proxy for nepotism or the role of social networks, with the children of higher income parents earning more than equally skilled children of lower income parents. See Mulligan (1997) , and the application and interpretation of this formulation by Corak and Piraino (2016) , who add parental income to Equation 1. This simplified model also probably encourages us to think of e, and its evolution between generations, as a genetic endowment. But the literature on epigenetics cautions against making a sharp distinction between "nature and nurture," and it might be more constructive to view e as embodying a host of inherent and environmental factors. Becker and Tomes (1986) think in these terms. Heckman and Mosso (2014) recognize this by generalizing Equation 2 to reflect the recursive process that more accurately models child development, the multi-faceted nature of skills, and the role and complementarities of human capital investments within and across the successive stages through which development occurs.
role of private versus public investments in children. This underscores the fact that not all cross-country comparisons are relevant, with some comparisons more likely to reveal the impact of policy and institutions than they are to reflect differences in social priorities.
Values toward inequality and economic opportunity
Simply put, values and institutions differ, and this has long played a role in understanding differences in the nature and size of the welfare state, particularly between continental Europe and North America (Alesina and Glaeser 2004) . In a similar way, the priority societies place on equality of opportunity enhancing policies will reflect underlying values. Arguably, these are more similar across the Canadian-American border than elsewhere.
Public opinion polls find that Americans and Canadians define the "American Dream" in virtually the same way. The Pew Charitable Trusts conducted a number of public opinion polls asking Americans what meaning they attach to the phrase "The American Dream." The responses have been stable through time, and a poll conducted in late January and early February 2009 was adapted and conducted in Canada in August and September of the same year (Corak 2010) . Figure 1 summarizes one of the major findings by indicating the percentage of respondents in each country answering eight or higher on a ten point scale for each of the possible definitions of the "American Dream" presented to them.
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The point estimates are very similar, particularly so with respect to the options most closely related to intergenerational mobility. Sixty percent of American respondents ranked being able to succeed regardless of family background eight or higher on a ten point scale, while 59 percent of Canadians did so.
3 The percentage indicating that the statement "Your children being better off financially than you" represents the American Dream was 64 percent in the United States, and 57 percent in Canada. While these two options relate most directly to intergenerational mobility, they do not offer clear guidance on the appropriate way to measure it statistically. The reference to children being financially better off most clearly refers to absolute mobility using an intra-family reference point, but "being able to succeed regardless of family background" leaves the reference point undefined and may be interpreted in a relative or an absolute sense. The differences between these responses, and those to all but one of the other options listed in the figure, are not statistically significant. The only Figure 1 : Percentage of respondents in comparable public opinion polls indicating eight or higher on a ten point scale to alternative descriptions of the American Dream exception is that forty percent of Americans suggested "Owning your own business" is a strong marker of the meaning of the American Dream, but at 29 percent significantly fewer Canadians reported feeling the same way.
Americans and Canadians also have a similar view of the factors determining upward economic mobility. Figure 2 , drawn from information in the same source, lists a host of determinants of upward mobility, ranging from factors that are not subject to individual choice or responsibility-like race, gender, and luck-to others entirely within an individual's locus of control-like hard work, and having ambition-as well as a number of others that may reflect both extremes as well as public policy choices.
Representative samples in both countries tend to see factors associated with individual choice and responsibility as the prime drivers of economic mobility. Ninety-two percent of Americans and 88 percent of Canadians reported that "hard work" was either essential or very important in determining upward mobility, and 89 percent of respondents in both countries also felt this way about "having ambition". On the other hand, small minorities in both countries cited race, gender, or luck as being essential or very important, "luck" being the most cited with 21 percent of Americans and 22 percent of Canadians thinking of it in these terms. The responses across all 16 factors presented to respondents are very similar across the two countries, often essentially the same with the only notable exception being that Americans were somewhat more likely to view the state of the economy as important.
4
This said, Americans tend to view family background more importantly than Canadians. Twenty-eight percent of American respondents versus 24 percent of Canadians said that "coming from a wealthy family" was essential or very important, and 37 percent versus 30 percent viewed having "educated parents" in the same way. On the other hand, Canadians were more likely to cite "knowing the right people" as an essential or very important driver of mobility.
5
But if Americans and Canadians have a similar meaning of the good life, and similar views on how to attain it, they have significantly different views on the role of collective action through public policy. McCall (2017) uses 2000 data from The International Social Survey Programme to point out that while 35 percent of Americans "strongly agree" or "agree" with the statement "Government's responsibility is to reduce gap between high and low incomes," a significantly larger proportion (47 percent) of Canadians have this view. Even if this issue is not supported by a plurality of Canadians, the difference is significant. However, these two countries are much more similar than respondents in European countries, where the majority, and often the strong majority, in Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, West Germany, and France feel redistribution is an important government responsibility.
4 This likely reflects the fact that the survey was, as mentioned, conducted in January and February 2009, during the height of the Great Recession. The recession was notably more severe in the United States. In addition, the Canadian survey was conducted about six months later. Findings from Corak (2010) also suggest that Americans and Canadians share a preference for equality of opportunities over equality of outcomes: 71 percent of Americans and 68 percent of Canadians felt it was more important "to ensure everyone has a fair chance of improving their economic standing" than "to reduce inequality." This said, Canadians are more likely to offer a more "activist" role for their governments.
A notable difference between the two countries concerns the role of government as a means to influence economic mobility. When asked if the government does more to help or more to hurt people trying to move up the economic ladder, respondents in both countries lacked strong proclivities. However, 46 percent of Canadians feel that government does more to help than to hurt, compared to 36 percent of Americans. On the other hand, 46 percent of Americans feel government does more to hurt versus 39 percent of Canadians. The difference in the responses to this question was among the largest of all questions asked (Corak 2010, 17) . This is as much a statement about differences in beliefs about the efficacy and efficiency of public policy as it is about ideological differences on the role of the state, and has a clear echo in the public opinion research conducted by Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018) . They focus on the relationship between perceptions of intergenerational mobility and preferences for redistribution in the United States and four European countries. Canada is not part of their analysis, and their purpose is not the same as ours, focusing on intergenerational mobility to understand the strength of preferences for equality of outcomes. But they underscore the point that beliefs about the role of government intervention are at the core of political polarization, and lead to different views on what to do about intergenerational mobility even if the lack of it is perceived as a problem.
For example, in the PEW-EKOS polls a slight majority of Americans (51 percent) feels that cutting taxes would be a "very effective" government action to improve mobility, but only 38 percent of Canadians feel the same way (Corak 2010, Figure 7 ). These differences imply different public policy capacities. Hoynes and Stabile (2017) document the very dramatic differences in income support for lower income families in the two countries, the safety net being drawn much more tightly in Canada. Even if underlying values are the same in these two countries, perceptions about the role of public policy-and ultimately the range and design of policy-may be very different.
This relates directly to the emphasis Solon (2004) puts on the "progressivity" of public investment in human capital. His model also suggests that cross-country differences in the design of public policies-in addition to differences in the inheritability of endowments, the returns to human capital investment, and the capacity of family income to influence a child's human capital-play a role in determining differences in intergenerational mobility. All of these factors may come into play in understanding Canada-US differences. But since these two countries define and value mobility in the same way, comparing them may help place a sharper focus on differing beliefs about the role of public policy. In other words, a Canada-US comparison might open up a wider menu of choices in American public debate than if the comparison was just over time within the country, or for that matter to European public policy, which can be more easily dismissed as not relevant to American values.
Data and measurement
The economics literature on intergenerational income mobility has grown significantly since the early 1990s when the maturing of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics offered Solon (1992) the opportunity to estimate intergenerational income elasticities with nationally representative data spanning two generations.
6 The surveys of this research by Björklund and Jäntti (2011) , Black and Devereux (2011), Blanden (2013) , Corak (2013; , Mulligan (1997) , Solon (2002; , and Stuhler (2018) reveal the important role that the construction and availability of new data plays in offering opportunities to both revisit longstanding issues, and imagine new possibilities. In Canada this took the form of the development of inter-generationally linked income tax data by Corak and Heisz (1999) , which were used to estimate an intergenerational elasticity of about 0.2-a finding similar to Fortin and Lefebvre (1998) who use Census data-and at least half the magnitude of the best available estimate for the US (Solon 1992; Mazumder 2005a; 2005b; Zimmerman 1992) . 7 The most important recent advance in the American literature has been the development and use of similar tax-based data from the Internal Revenue Service by Chetty et al. (2014) and Mitnik et al. (2015) , confirming intergenerational income elasticities of about 0.4 and likely approaching 0.6. Mazumder (2018) incorporates these findings in his literature review to suggest that the consensus estimate of the father-son intergenerational elasticity of incomes should be considered to be about 0.6. Analyses with tax-based data also suggest the use of a wider variety of intergenerational statistics and, as illustrated by Chetty et al. (2014) , sub-national analysis as an important new research possibility.
We update and re-construct the Canadian data to permit a direct comparison with the regional analysis of the United States offered by Chetty et al. (2014) . This involves examining labor market outcomes in 2011 and 2012, but for a younger cohort born in 1980 and in 1982. Our development of these data is meant to line up as closely as possible to the American equivalent, and as such we are not in a position to examine intergenerational income mobility at the most appropriate stage in the life cycle, when the children are in their late 30s to mid 40s.
8 As such, we follow Chetty et al. (2014) in focusing on different measures of rank mobility, which tend to be stable by the time individuals reach their early 30s (Corak 2018 Canadians file income taxes as individuals, but the tax form-referred to as the T1 Formrequires identifying information about a spouse or common-law partner to be provided. We 6 Zimmerman (1992) offered a contemporaneous analysis that did not use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
7 The Canadian data, called the Intergenerational Income Database, have also been used by Chen, Ostrovsky, and Piraino (2017) , Corak (2001) , Corak, Gustafsson, and Osterberg (2004) , Corak and Heisz (1998) , Corak and Piraino (2016; , Grawe (2004; , Oreopoulos (2003) , Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens (2008) to study a host of issues, and in some cases offer causal analysis.
8 Chen, Ostrovsky, and Piraino (2017) offer an analysis of cohorts born in the mid 1960s who are followed up to 2008 in a manner that takes full account of the life-cycle biases discussed by Grawe (2006) , Jenkins (1987) , and Haider and Solon (2006) . They estimate the father-son elasticity to be 0.32, and offer a Canada-US comparison from this perspective. Corak (2018) uses the data on this older cohort in the same manner we do, offering regional estimates for the 266 Census Divisions defined in the 1986 Canadian Census, with the more appropriate point in the life-cycle allowing estimates of the regression to the mean model in incomes.
are able to construct a "family income" variable for both parents and children (in adulthood) and their spouses in the manner of Chetty et al. (2014) : the total (before tax) income of both partners in the household using the Canada Revenue Agency definition of total income (all market sources of income plus all government transfers).
9 Parent total income is averaged over the tax years 1996 to 2000, a potential of up to five years for each parent. If a parent's T1 record is not found for a particular year, income is assigned a value of zero. This framework is comprehensive in using not only a wide definition of income, but also including both sons and daughters, as well as children raised by single parents.
The intergenerational link of tax returns between parents and children requires that the child has a Social Insurance Number while living at home. Some parents obtain a Social Insurance Number for their children early in their lives, but others do not and for the birth cohorts we study it is usually obtained when the child enters the labor market, whether part-time as a teenager or later. The link between parent and child Social Insurance Numbers is made with the algorithm described by Corak and Heisz (1999) . The appendix offers a detailed explanation of the structure of the data, and the creation of our analytical sample. Chetty et al. (2014) use children born between 1980 and 1982, whose parents are identified and have a positive mean income between 1996 and 2000. A small difference is that our analysis uses only those children born in 1980 and 1982, the 1981 birth cohort not being part of underlying data created from income tax files by Statistics Canada.
The adult income of these children is defined in a similar way, on the basis of the average total income during 2011 and 2012, including any spousal income if a spouse is present. The American data considers only partners who are married, putting aside common law relationships. Our use of the Canadian data treats common law partnerships as married since for the most part they are recognized in the Canadian income tax system as such, and form a very important fraction of many long-term stable relationships in some provinces, particularly in Québec. The proportion of the relationships that are either identified as married or common law in these tax files is about 50 percent, just below the 55 percent recorded as married in the United States.
Children not filing a T1 Form in 2011 or 2012, or in both years, are assigned an income of zero. We add the income from the child's spouse, if a spouse is present, to own income in calculating the child's "family" income. All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2012 Canadian dollars using the national Consumer Price Index, and then to US dollars using the Purchasing Power Parity rate for 2012 produced by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1.28 Canadian dollars per US dollar).
9 More specifically, this consists of: earnings from an employer-employee relationship as indicated on the T4 form, and including commissions, interest and investment income, other employment income, other income, pension and super-annuity income, rental income, self-employment net income (from business, commissions, farming, fishing or professional activities), as well as capital gains and losses, and dividends (taxable and appropriately grossed up to reflect changes in tax treatment). It also includes: Old Age Security pension, Canada/Quebec Pension Plan benefits, and Employment Insurance benefits. In addition, for the years from 1986 onward total income is defined to include tax credits associated with the Goods and Services Tax and Harmonized Sales Tax; from 1992, Net Federal supplements, Social Assistance payments and Workers' Compensation payments; from 1996, Guaranteed Income Supplements; and from 1998, limited partnership income and Registered Retirement Savings Plan income.
A child's geographic location is based upon the postal code provided in the T1 form in the year the child is linked to his or her parents. This is consistent with Chetty et al. (2014) , who use the 1996 location for 96 percent of their sample. The postal code is converted to Census geography codes using Statistics Canada's Postal Code Conversion Files. The analysis is based on the Census Division, which roughly corresponds to a county or municipality, the sub-provincial level of government used to deliver provincial and municipal services. Not all provinces have such a level of government, and in these cases Statistics Canada in consultation with provincial counterparts defines an equivalent geographic area so that the entire country is covered. In the 1996 Census there are 288 Census Divisions. Conceptually, this geographic unit is somewhat narrower than the Commuting Zones used in the American data, but practically they are similar as some Census Divisions cover a significant geographic area, though in some cases much wider than would be suggested by commuting patterns. This implies that our sub-national analysis involves, together with the 741 Commuting Zones in the US data, over 1,000 regions.
In the manner of Chetty et al. (2014) we also use Census data to derive a host of economic and demographic variables profiling the Census Divisions. This is mostly based on the one-in-five micro-data associated with the 1996 Canadian Census, the data from the so-called "Long Form" that roughly 20 percent of Canadians are required to complete. In this way we are able to explore the community level correlates of intergenerational mobility statistics we derive from the tax data for each region.
Theory offers only a partial guide to the choice of statistics to measure intergenerational mobility, and to some degree research is increasingly informed not just by the limitations and opportunities of available data, but also by public policy discussion. Becker and Tomes (1986; 1979) focus empirical attention on the regression to the mean model of incomes: y i,t = α + βy i,t−1 + ε i , where once again y i,t represents the natural logarithm of permanent income of a member of family i in generation t, and α and β are the parameters usually estimated by least squares that respectively measure absolute and relative income mobility. As stressed, only under very specific circumstances is β a structural parameter, and it should more accurately be understood to be a broad summary indicator of intergenerational income mobility reflecting both the correlation of standardized incomes and differences in the variance of incomes between generations. This said, even as a descriptive statistic it does not capture all dimensions of the process, rank mobility not being explicitly measured, and the linearity assumption implying that the rate of mobility is the same across the entire parental income distribution. As such, we are agnostic as to the appropriate measure of mobility. Like Chetty et al. (2014) we downplay the intergenerational elasticity in large measure because of the potential for life-cycle biases.
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We focus on summary indicators of rank mobility derived from a rank-rank regression:
, where R i,j,t refers to the percentile rank in the national income distribution of an individual in family i, belonging to generation t, from region j when the analysis is sub-national. To be clear, we are following Chetty et al. (2014) in defining a child's geography on the basis of where he or she lived as a teenager, but our measure of permanent income is determined without regard to where the child may be living as an adult, a little more than a decade later. Geographic mobility is embodied in this analysis, and children and parents-regardless of where they live-are placed in the national income distributions to determine their rank, not in the local income distribution. The parameters of this model are estimated using least squares, with a j offering a measure of absolute mobility-the expected rank of a child raised by bottom percentile parents-and b j a measure of relative rank mobility-the increase in a child's rank for every percentile increase in the parents' rank.
Our focus is also on certain cells of the quintile transition matrix, in particular the chances that a child born to bottom quintile parents will rise to the top quintile-so-called rags to riches mobility-and the chances that he or she will grow up to in turn be a bottom quintile adult-the intergenerational cycle of low income. These are referred to, respectively, as P 1,5 = Pr{Y t ∈ top|Y t−1 ∈ bottom} and P 1,1 = Pr{Y t ∈ bottom|Y t−1 ∈ bottom}, where Y t and Y t−1 refer respectively to child and parent permanent income. We calculate these statistics for the country as a whole and for each sub-national unit.
Canadian incomes are placed both in the Canadian income distribution, and also in the American income distribution. The sub-national analysis is based entirely on the latter ranking. In this case the assigned ranks refer to the percentile rank in the United States, and the transition matrices derived from this ranking are not strictly transition matrices as the rows are not constrained to add to one. The online appendix to Chetty et al. (2014) lists the national marginal income distributions by percentile.
11 Table 1 shows average parent and child incomes for selected percentiles of the income distributions, based upon the national cut-offs. The average income in the bottom percentile of the child's income distribution in the analytical file Chetty et al. (2014) use is -$43,800, and all percentiles up to the sixth have an average income of zero. This may appear odd as the objective is to estimate permanent income, and it is hard to rationalize how anyone can have a negative or even zero permanent income. But Chetty et al. (2014) motivate the decision to keep these very low incomes because of high incarceration rates among some groups of the US population in this cohort. Excluding these groups would likely induce a more severe sample-selection bias at the low end of the income distribution.
12 This is appropriate since the two-year window relatively early in the child's life-span places an even greater limitation on estimating permanent income. As mentioned, the Canadian data is also constructed to include observations with low incomes, though this is not common in the existing literature which generally imposes a cut-off of $500 or more on incomes averaged over five years.
Table 1 also shows that while Canadian parents tend to have lower average income within almost all percentiles, other than the very bottom percentiles, this is markedly so higher up in the income distribution. To be in the top 20 percent, and certainly to be in the top five percent and the top one or two percent, implies having a good deal more income in the United States than in Canada. Children in the United States are raised in a context of greater top-end income inequality. At the same time, the adult incomes of Canadian children are higher in the middle of the income distribution than in the United States. This said, child top incomes are also higher in the United States. 13 When Canadian parents are placed in the American income distribution, 29.7 percent fall into the bottom quintile, and only 5.2 percent in the top. The patterns are not as extreme for Canadian children, but similar: 20.7 percent of Canadian children in adulthood fall into the bottom fifth of the American income distribution, and 12.5 percent into the top fifth.
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Between country comparisons
We confirm the general notion in the literature viewing Canada as more intergenerationally mobile than the United States, but in motivating the remainder of our analysis, note that this finding may be complemented and nuanced in an important way with subnational comparisons.
13 Research based on survey data for the 1990s finds that when Canadian children are placed in the US income distribution they are much less likely to be in the bottom decile of the US income distribution than their American counterparts, reflecting differences in the polarization of labor markets, the structure of families, and the more generous Canadian system of income support. To be clear, however, this result does not account for in-kind support-in particular SNAP (food stamps)-which tend to be greater in the United States. This limitation also applies to analyses based on income tax data. See Corak, Curtis, and Phipps (2011) .
14 For parents, 28.3, 24.9 and 11.9 percent place in the second, the third, and the next to top quintile; for children these percentages are 18.8, 22.8 and 25.1. Least squares estimates of relative income and rank mobility, the estimates of the parameters β and b, are presented in Table 2 for a number of different sample selection rules in a way that follows some of the findings in Chetty et al. (2014 Table I ), from which the estimates for the United States are drawn. The first panel offers the intergenerational elasticities, and the second the rank-rank slope estimate, where ranks are determined both by the within-country percentile distribution, and by placing Canadians in the American income distribution.
The Canadian intergenerational income elasticity is lower. All the coefficients, and all the differences between the countries, are statistically significant, the largest standard error in the table being 0.006 (that for the Canadian estimate in row 4), with most being about 0.001 for Canada, and in the range of 0.0003 to 0.0004 for the United States. The Canadian estimates of the elasticities are similar to those in the existing literature, but not directly comparable to them: our income definition is unique, the samples include both men and women, and are, at least for a comparison with the best current estimates in Chen, Ostrovsky, and Piraino (2017) , early in the life cycle.
15 The estimates of relative rank mobility in Table  2 imply that a child raised by top percentile parents in the United States will rank about 31 to 34 percentiles higher in the income distribution than a bottom percentile child, but in 15 The exception is a comparison to Corak (2018) , who uses the same administrative data source and income definitions, but with an older cohort of Canadians born in the mid 1960s, whose outcomes are measured over a five year period ending in 2008. Interestingly, he reports a Canada-wide elasticity that, at 0.20, is actually a bit lower than the lowest estimate offered in the first panel of Table 2 . Both of these sets of estimates are much lower than those offered by Chen, Ostrovsky, and Piraino (2017) , but these authors also suggest that their results should be understood to be about half as great as comparable US estimates. Canada this difference would, at 21 to 23 percentiles, be a full decile lower.
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Figure 3 contrasts rank mobility between the two countries in a way that permits a comparison of both absolute and relative mobility. The slope is flatter in Canada, and the intercept is higher, the combination implying that Canadian children will rank higher than their American counterparts until about the median of parent income is reached. The expected rank of a Canadian child raised by bottom quintile parents is somewhat above the 40 th percentile, but for an American significantly below. To reach a similar point on the US income ladder an American child would have to have parents who ranked as high as the 30 th percentile. The US "middle class" is within easier reach for low income Canadian children, than it is for low income Americans.
This said, the information in Figure 3 also implies that American children raised by top quintile parents are more likely to rank higher than their Canadian counterparts. The rankrank relationship tends to show more non-linearity in Canada, but top percentile Canadians still cannot expect to see their children attain the same rank as top percentile Americans.
16 Corak (2018 Table 5 ) reports a rank-rank slope for Canada of 0.242 when child outcomes are measured at 35 to 48 years of age, and 0.240 when measured for the same cohort at 31 and 32 years of age. This is in the range of our estimates, suggesting that percentile ranks are established by the time children reach the early 30s, as Chetty et al. (2014) suggest with US data, and as Nybom and Stuhler (2017) show with Swedish data.
There also seems to be more pronounced non-linearities at the bottom of the Canadian income distribution, certainly over the course of the bottom decile of the parent distribution. To some degree the linear rank-rank model is a less accurate summary indicator of rank mobility in Canada than Chetty et al. (2014) find it is for the United States. Table 3 presents another perspective on these movements by offering estimates of the quintile transition matrices for the two countries, including two estimates for Canada: Panel 2 based on the Canadian quintile cut-offs, and Panel 3 based upon the ranks that would be ascribed to Canadian parents and children if they were placed in their respective American income distributions. Panels 1 and 2 show that there is a good deal of intergenerational mobility for a large segment of the population in these two countries, for children raised in families from the 20 th to the 80 th percentiles. Family income in these middle quintiles seems rather loosely related to child outcomes, the quintile transition probabilities hovering a bit above and a bit below 0.20. In this sense, intergenerational mobility may actually contribute to middle class anxiety, parents not being able to greatly influence their child's station in life. There certainly are distinct gradients between the 20 th and 80 th percentiles, and somewhat more so in the United States, but these are notably sharper for children from bottom quintile and top quintile parents.
The children of top quintile parents in the United States have an almost 37 percent chance of staying in the top quintile as adults, and face about one-in-ten chance of falling to the bottom fifth of the income distribution. Panel 2 shows that in Canada, this tilt is also present but not as extreme: just less than a 30 percent chance of remaining in the top, and more than a 15 percent chance of falling to the bottom.
17 A similar pattern is displayed at the other extreme of the income distribution. In both the United States and Canada, bottom quintile children face about a one-in-three chance of an intergenerational cycle of bottom income, but a rags to riches movement is more likely for Canadians than Americans, the odds being less than one-in-ten in the US but higher in Canada. The 7.5 percent chance of moving from a bottom quintile to a top quintile family in the United States is the lowest probability listed in Panels 1 and 2.
The mobility of low income Canadian children is even greater when they and their parents are ranked according to the US income distribution. Panel 3 of the table shows they are somewhat less likely to stay in the bottom as their American counterparts (29.1 percent versus 33.7 percent), and much more likely to rise to the top half of the income distribution, though not necessarily more likely to rise to the top fifth.
All three dimensions of this cross-country comparison, but in particular this last result related to the prospects of low income children, put the so-called "American Dream" in sharp relief, and offer stronger evidence to support the growing perception in the literature that this Dream-if it is defined in terms of income mobility and the opportunity to, in terms of 17 Nybom and Stuhler (2017) and O'Neill, Sweetman, and Van de gaer (2007) note that measurement error in both parent and child incomes influences transition matrices in a non-classical way, leading to an overstatement of mobility in middle parts of the distribution, and an understatement at the extremes. While our correction for measurement error in child incomes is imperfect-an averaging of only two years of child incomes-we don't expect this to influence quintile transition matrices, but for this reason put aside a detailed look at the extremes of the percentile transition matrices. Source: Authors' calculations, and Chetty et al. (2014, Table II) Figure 1, "succeed regardless of family background"-is more of a reality in Canada than the United States. But the sub-national research documented by Chetty et al. (2014) presents a challenge: the degree of intergenerational mobility varies significantly within the United States, with some regions showing much more mobility than that recorded even for the most mobile countries. Between country comparisons have more relevance when they are also accompanied by within country comparisons.
Between and within country comparisons
In fact, these markers of intergenerational mobility have somewhat more variation across the 288 Canadian Census Divisions than across the 709 American Commuting Zones for which we are able to calculate rank mobility estimates. The unweighted standard deviation of the rank-rank intercept is 6.82 in Canada, and at 6.89 about the same in the United States. But the standard deviation of the rank-rank slope is notably higher in Canada: 0.113 versus 0.0648. This suggests a certain overlap in these statistics across regions. The two countries, in other words, may not be perfectly distinguished by the border between them.
Figure 4 maps Canada and the United States according to the value of P 1,1 , defined by the quintile cut-offs of the American income distribution. The roughly 1,000 regions of the two countries are categorized into five groups, with the most mobile cut-off placed at 0.2, and the upper cut-off at 0.35. There is a clear border effect between some parts of the two countries. An important exception involves the most mobile areas, extending from eastern parts of Alberta and the southern parts of Saskatchewan to neighbouring North Dakota through the adjoining regions between Manitoba and Minnesota. But the national border is clearly distinguished further east, and particularly between the lower Great Lakes regions all the way through to the eastern seaboard. Most of the regions in the eastern part of the United States are characterized by a transition probability of 0.3 or higher. This part of Canada has only a few pockets with a greater than 0.35 chance of intergenerational poverty that are shared with regions scattered throughout United States. For the most part the highest probabilities of intergenerational cycles of low income are found in northern parts of Canada. Indigenous populations are significant in these areas, and many are sparsely populated.
Rags to riches mobility, P 1,5 , is not as sharply distinguished between the two countries with one important exception. Figure 5 maps this probability. Southern Ontario-the most populous part of Canada lying north of Lake Ontario and Lake Erie-displays a similar bottom to top quintile mobility as adjacent regions in Michigan, Ohio, and New York State, most regions being categorized in the 0.05 to 0.10 range. This said, some areas of Québec adjacent to New York State, Vermont, and New Hampshire display a lower probability than their counterparts in Ontario and New England. Regions with rather high chances of escaping low income and rising to the very top quintile cover the American midwest, where in most Commuting Zones the probability is more than 20 percent, similar probabilities being experienced in the adjacent regions of western Canada. Similarities also extend, roughly speaking, across the border into Canada from the northwest of the United States. The distinct difference between the countries is the significant pockets of very low bottom to top quintile mobility in parts of the southern states. This is a concentrated area of low upward mobility covering a significant proportion of the population that does not have a parallel in Canada, or at least to the extent it does covers a rather small proportion of the Canadian population.
These comparisons are hard to generalize for at least two reasons. First, they are only two possible measures of intergenerational mobility. As policy relevant as they may be, they do not embody all dimensions of mobility. Second, while the maps are striking illustrations leaving strong impressions, they are based upon arbitrary-though intuitively appealing-probability cut-offs. For these reasons we focus on an alternative descriptive approach that allows us to simultaneously use a total of five available indicators. We cluster the regions with K -means, an unsupervised machine learning algorithm. To be clear, this is not an exercise in prediction, but rather one of clustering units into a predetermined number of groups according to a metric of all available mobility indicators. We chose the number of groupings according to our purpose. This is an exercise in description, intended to serve a communication purpose and set directions for more detailed analysis. It permits us to be agnostic about the choice of indicator in order to highlight which regions of Canada and the United States are more similar to each other than to other parts of the country. In this way we assess more rigorously whether, and to what extent, the national border falls out as the aftermath of the categorization.
Briefly, K -means partitions observations into groups which minimize the within-cluster variation, defined as the sum of all the pairwise squared Euclidean distances. The optimization problem involves:
where K is the number of pre-defined clusters, C k denotes a cluster, i and j represent particular observations within a cluster, and x j is one of the p features of the data. We use five such features: relative rank mobility as measured by the least squares estimate of the rank-rank slope (b j ), absolute mobility as measured by the least squares estimate of the intercept of the rank-rank regression (a j ), the mean of parent incomes in the region, and the two quintile transition probabilities highlighted in Figures 4 and 5, P 1,1 and P 1,5 . It is in this sense that we claim to be agnostic as to the appropriate statistic measuring intergenerational mobility. The algorithm solving equation 4 is described in James et al. (2013) and Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman (2009) .
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Figure 6 maps the American Commuting Zones and the Canadian Census Divisions when they are forced to belong to only two clusters. In other words, with this map we seek to determine if the K -means algorithm would classify these regions into two groups according to the international border. It does so only partially, and in a way hinted at by the previous maps: large parts of Canada are grouped with the more mobile regions of the United States, but other parts with the less mobile American regions. The vast majority of Canadian Census Divisions covering the most populated parts of the country have a degree of intergenerational mobility more in common with each other than with neighbouring regions of the northeastern United States. But these areas would also be grouped with regions in the mid-western parts of both countries. There are also regions in the north of the country that have more in common with a large swath of the American South and eastern seaboard than they do with the rest of Canada.
The first panel of Table 4 offers the total number of regions and populations of these 18 We use the Stata package Cluster and the command cluster kmeans with 500 random restarts, and present the results that maximize the Calinski-Harabasz Pseudo-F, which is the ratio of between-cluster variance to within-cluster variance. This is a "top-down" approach to clustering requiring the number of clusters to be pre-determined. We employed up to 2,000 restarts and found no significant change in the results. We examined up to 10 pre-determined clusters in deciding upon the results in the text. An alternative approach would be to use agglomerative (bottom-up) clustering, which does not require the number of clusters to be pre-specified. Table 5 shows it does not cover the most populous regions of Canada, which are included in the cluster that is more mobile according to the absolute and relative rank indicators, and the two transition probabilities. About two-thirds of our sample, and 60 percent of Canadians according to the 2001 Census, lived in the areas covered by Cluster 1. This cluster is also a cluster of regions with lower average parent incomes. This is not our preferred number of clusters, and does not accurately capture the variance in the data. But that, in part, is the point. When sub-national indicators of mobility are available for analysis they do not naturally support the conclusion that a simple between country analysis is an appropriate way to view intergenerational mobility. We conduct the analysis repeatedly with up to ten clusters being pre-specified, and judge that a four-cluster mapping is the best way to communicate the regional variation in mobility. This is mapped in Figure 7 , and shows that the clustering continues to occur on either side of the international border, for the most part a line being drawn along the Great Lakes and Saint Lawrence River regions, one that continues to distinguish the New England States from the Atlantic Provinces. The clusters associated with the most and the least mobility span the border, one running through the mid west of the United States and into Saskatchewan and most of Alberta, another grouping the Southern United States with Northern parts of Canada. The second panel of Table 4 summarizes the mobility measures in this four-cluster map. Cluster 3 contains the largest fraction of the population, and Table 5 documents that it is almost exclusively based in the United States, covering significant portions of the northeast, mid-west, and western coastal areas. Only five Canadian Census Divisions are grouped into this cluster. Cluster 3 is distinguished from Clusters 1 and 2, which together geographically cover most of Canada and 85 percent of our sample. Mobility is generally lower in the American dominant Cluster 3, while average parental income is higher. A top percentile parent in Cluster 3 has children who can expect to rank about 32 percentiles higher than a bottom percentile parent, almost a decile more than in Cluster 2. The probability of an intergenerational cycle of low income is also significantly higher in Cluster 3, on average about one-third.
The three clusters spanning the border are higher and lower mobility areas. Cluster 1 running through Alberta and Saskatchewan into the mid-west American states is the highest mobility area of these two countries, with absolute rank mobility of more than 45 percentiles, with probabilities of rags to riches movement and intergenerational low income in the neighborhood of 20 percent. This cluster includes significant parts of the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan, and also of Newfoundland and Labrador, a province traditionally considered a low income-low mobility region. These regions experienced robust labor markets during the period we are measuring child outcomes as a result of a boom in oil, potash, and other commodity prices. Rising wage rates and labor supply led to significant increases in median incomes during the first decade of the 2000s.
19 This highlights the fact that our measure of permanent income for children may be less than perfect in a way that has differential national impacts. Measurement error in child incomes is often not considered to imply an attenuation bias in the estimation of the intergenerational income elasticity, leading only to a loss of efficiency. But this is not the case with rank-based statistics, which require Figure 7 : A four cluster mapping shows that some regions lie largely on either side of the Canada-United States border but that others are not confined to one country both parent and child incomes to be corrected for measurement (Nybom and Stuhler 2017) . We average child incomes over only a two-year period during the height of this boom, and as such do not take the period of lower prices after 2014 into account. In this sense these time-specific events likely lead us to overstate the permanent incomes of children in these Canadian regions.
This would also apply to regions of the United States experiencing a commodity-boom at the same time. It is interesting to note that Corak (2018) averages child incomes over a five year period ending in 2008, and while Newfoundland and Labrador does not appear as a particularly high mobility region, at least for a cohort of Canadians who as adults were 38 to 45 years of age, Saskatchewan and Alberta continue to represent the most mobile regions of the country. This suggests something other than a transitory shock is at play in determining our results. Even to the extent that our findings are related to commodity price movements, this would reflect a clear lesson from theory: that relatively more equal and inclusive labor markets lead to more generational mobility. The commodity boom should not be understood as the sole driver of mobility in this cluster, which also includes communities that have other advantages. As theory and Chetty et al. (2014) stress, these relate to family structure, community resources associated with social capital, and an ethic of geographic mobility.
Average parent income is not noticeably different across the three clusters spanning the border. The most mobile cluster, labelled as Cluster 1, is significantly less populated than the low mobility cluster, labelled as Cluster 4 in Figure 7 and Table 4 . Cluster 4 is most notably distinguished from the others by a very low rags to riches movement, and has the highest chance of intergenerational low income. The chances that a child born to bottom quintile parents will also be a bottom quintile adult averages 36 percent. Escaping low income is a challenge not only in the southern United States, but also in some northern parts of Canada.
We examined an alternate specification that undertook the clustering not on the standardized values of the five features, but on the standardized residuals of least squares estimates in which each feature is regressed against a set of variables that the literature suggests are correlated with mobility. These are described in the next section, and include: the Gini coefficient; the unionization rate; variables related to family structure; the racial and ethnic composition of the population; the educational qualifications of the adult population; the labor force participation rate of teenagers; and employment shares by industry. Using the residuals from these models removes part of the observed variation in mobility across regions. This analysis continues to find that Canada's population share located in the cluster with highest mobility is larger than for the United States, 24 percent versus 21 percent. In addition, 30 percent of Americans live in low-mobility areas, compared to 20 percent of Canadians. The implication is that our major findings continue to hold even when accounting for a host of observable characteristics.
Another check on our findings focuses the analysis on the border regions. We re-examined the original clustering analysis by using only regions close to the border, defined as the straight-line distance from the centroid of each Census Division and Commuting Zone to the international border. We examined regions defined by distances ranging from 100 kilometers to 600 kilometers. Sixty one percent of Canadians live in the 107 Census Divisions within 100 kilometers to the border, but only 4.7 percent of Americans live in the adjacent 39 Commuting Zones. These proportions rise to 78 percent and 11 percent when we use a 200 kilometer limit, and to 96.6 percent and 46.5 percent when we use a 600 kilometer limit. A two-cluster map using only the regions falling within a 600 kilometer straight-line distance looks essentially like Figure 6 , with the Great Lakes and Northeastern regions of the United States continuing to be clearly distinguished from the central and eastern parts of Canada.
20 Table 6 offers the same summary information as Table 4 for these regions, yielding similar results.
The grouping of these regions into four clusters is also presented in the second panel of the Table, with Figure 8 offering the equivalent four cluster map. These results echo those described in Table 4 , allowing us to summarize by suggesting that Canada and the United States share regions of both high and low mobility, but are distinguished by the fact that on average-where the great bulk of the population lives-most Americans live in regions of less mobility, with parental income ranks being more strongly related to child ranks, and the chances of escaping low income being lower. What also drives the cross-national differences in mobility indicators is the fact that the low mobility regions the two countries have in common carry different weights in the overall national populations. The low mobility regions of the United States weigh more heavily in determining country-wide mobility than they do in Canada. For example, the weighted average of the absolute rank mobility statistic is 35.8 in the United States, and would rise to 39.6 if the regions in Cluster 4 were excluded from the calculation. A similar calculation in Canada sees the statistic moving up less dramatically, from 40.6 to only 41.4. The rags to riches probability increases from 10 percent to 12.4 Figure 8 : A four cluster mapping using only regions within 600 kilometers from the border percent in the United States, but in Canada only from 8.54 to 8.59 percent.
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Correlates of intergenerational mobility
Our analysis makes no pretense of offering causal explanations, neither of the intergenerational mobility process, nor the role of the national border. This said, there are clear and well documented differences between and within these two countries which our review of theory suggests all play a role in determining child outcomes, including differences in labor markets, demographics, and public policies associated with income support and investments in children. The most notable of these is the level of post-transfer income inequality that has been stressed in the literature on cross-country comparisons, including among others Solon (2004) and Corak (2013) . Figure 9 offers a version of the Great Gatsby Curve using our estimates of the slope of the parent-child rank-rank regression for each region, our data not providing the basis for deriving the co-variate generally used in this literature, the intergenerational income elasticity. As such, this is likely an attenuated version of the curve, not being influenced by differences in the variance of incomes between generations. The positive relationship between inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient for the parent incomes, and relative rank mobility is clear.
22 Chetty et al. (2014) point out that the Great Gatsby Curve is present within the United States, and Figure 9 suggests it also exists within Canada, as well as across the joint landscape of the two countries.
It is also clear from the picture that the strong majority of Canadian Census Divisions have a level of inequality that is comparatively lower than many of the American Commuting Zones. The median value of the Canadian Gini is 36.4, and three-quarters of the observations have a coefficient of less than 39.2. The US median is 39.8, with three-quarters of the observations falling below 45.7. It also appears from the picture that the relationship between these two variables is stronger in the Canadian data. These impressions are clear in the first row of the first panel of Table 7 , which presents correlation coefficients between relative rank mobility and inequality. The correlations with a number of other community characteristics are also offered. The second panel presents the correlations with absolute rank mobility.
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The correlation coefficient between relative rank mobility and the Gini is 0.381, but 0.425 for the Canadian data. The other factors most strongly correlated with relative rank mobility have to do with demographics: 0.498 with the fraction of single mothers in the community, and 0.473 with the fraction who are black. But these two variables also show 21 The changes in the bottom to bottom quintile transition probability are more similar, going from 30.7 percent to 27.3 percent in the United States, and from 26.6 to 24.8 percent in Canada. There would be a substantial jump in average community income in the United States amounting to more than $5,000, but just a $700 increase in Canada.
22 A small number of communities with a Gini coefficient of 65 or greater are dropped from the picture for the sake of exposition. They are not used in deriving the least squares line also drawn in the picture, which is based upon an unweighted regression.
23 The country-specific estimates in this table are based upon a within-country standardization of the data to have mean zero and standard deviation of one, while the entries for both countries are based on all the regions from both countries. different patterns between the countries, both correlations being higher than 0.6 in the United States, and much smaller in Canada. In fact, while the correlation with the black fraction of the population is statistically significant in the Canadian-only data, it is estimated to have a negative sign. This contrasts with the fraction of Indigenous peoples in the population, which has a much larger coefficient in Canada, the positive correlation with relative rank estimate indicating lower mobility. These patterns hold when the focus is on the relationship with absolute rank mobility in Panel 2 of the table, with the addition of the fraction of divorced parents also being significant in the United States, but not in Canada. Both absolute and relative rank mobility are lower in Canadian communities with a higher Indigenous population share, and lower in American communities with a higher black share.
These patterns continue to hold in multi-variate regressions with important nuances.
The Indigenous population share is a particularly strong correlate of less mobility in Canada, and though not as large in the United States is nonetheless significant both in magnitude and statistically when the focus is on absolute rank mobility. The black share of the community population is associated with lower absolute mobility in the multi-variate American results, while the fractions of divorced and of single parents become more important. These results are available upon request, and are used to derive a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the mean differences in relative and absolute mobility between the two countries. This suggests that these factors "explain" 5.9 percent of the relative mobility difference, and 89.1 percent of the absolute difference. While these decompositions and correlations only hint at suggestions for future causal analysis, in combination with our cluster analysis they offer a clearer picture of the descriptive differences between the countries. We suggest three broad themes calling for more analysis.
The first difference which merits study concerns the fact that race plays out differently in the two countries, being black matters for intergenerational mobility in the United States. To the extent that the communities we highlight as part of Cluster 4, the low mobility cluster dominated by the southern American states, have a higher black population, then this must be part of the explanation for the cross-country differences. This suggestion fits well with both Hertz (2005) and Bhattacharya and Mazumder (2011) who find that intergenerational mobility-particularly absolute mobility-among the black population is a good deal lower than among the general population. It also meshes with Chetty et al. (2018) , who offer a detailed geographic analysis of mobility by race, documenting the significantly lower rates of mobility among black men, and with Berger (2018) who associates American regions having low chances of upward mobility with a higher prevalence of slavery at the time of the Civil War, documenting a negative correlation between upward mobility measured by P 1,5 and prior slavery. It may be that the Canadian communities in this cluster also have significant challenges associated with minority status, but this is more likely reflected in the Indigenous status of their populations, and in this way has more in common with the low mobility Commuting Zones in the mid-west United States also falling into Cluster 4, which Chetty et al. (2014) identify as native reservations.
The second difference requiring further study concerns the nature and role of inequality, both labor market inequality, and after tax-transfer inequality reflecting the role of income support. Inequality is a strong correlate of intergenerational mobility, and the other distinguishing feature of the Canada-US landscape is that virtually all communities belonging to Cluster 3 fall on the American side of the border. The Gini coefficient in these areas is notably higher than Cluster 2, the cluster grouping the dominant proportion of the Canadian population. The mean Gini coefficient in Cluster 3 is 42.6 compared to 37.5 in Cluster 2, and the cut-offs for the third quartiles are 47.7 and 40.1 respectively. Top end inequality is much higher in these regions of the United States than in Canada, but as both Chetty et al. (2014) and Corak (2018) point out in separate analyses of the two countries, it is bottom end inequality and the share of the middle income population that matters for regional variation of intergenerational mobility. This may be a reason why Cluster 3 does not cross onto the Canadian side of the border. Derenoncourt (2018) examines the hypothesis that inequality in the lower end of the distribution may also be related to race, suggesting that cities and neighborhoods changed in ways that discriminated against blacks who moved northward during the Great Migration. Her results suggest that access to public goods and schooling became more restrictive, "white flight" depriving these migrants and their children of public investments that in turn had long-term negative consequences that continued across generations. If this is the case then the country differences in mobility process reflecting the dominant position of Cluster 3 in the United States may be inter-related with the differences reflected in Cluster 4, and in this way also associated with the distinct racial patterns on the United States side of the border.
The third issue meriting study concerns how these two themes, both related to the inequalities embedded in labor markets, interact with family structure and the support and investments families are able to make in their children. Marriage, divorce, and single motherhood seem to play out differently in the two countries, the intergenerational consequences being more detrimental in the United States. We have no basis for disentangling demographic influences on intergenerational mobility from labor market and public policy influences, but it is clear that these three broad factors interact in different ways across the border, and that the underlying causal directions-whether from labor market outcomes to family structure or the opposite-will in part inform the role and design of public policy.
Conclusion
Intergenerational income mobility is lower in the United States than in Canada, even when Canadians are placed in the American income distribution. This is the case almost without regard to the statistic used to gauge intergenerational dynamics: income mobility, rank mobility, or directional mobility measured by transition matrices. For example, our analysis of rank mobility shows that Canadian children raised by parents in the bottom fifth of the income distribution can on average aspire to rise more than 30 percentiles, approaching the median income in their generation. This is almost 10 percentiles higher than the expected rank of their American counterparts. These differences in rank mobility reflect a combination of differences in absolute mobility, the expected rise in the income distribution of child raised by bottom ranking parents, and differences in relative mobility, the transmission of an additional percentile rank among parents to their children.
We document public opinion research that we interpret as suggesting that a comparison between these two countries may be particularly apt. Canadians and Americans share values associated with their personal aspirations, and the aspirations they hold for their children. The "American Dream" has a very similar meaning on both sides of this international border, and citizens seem to have a common perspective on the importance of individual initiative and responsibility, and on the value associated with equality of outcomes versus equality of opportunity as social goals. As such, a pairing of these two countries may offer insights on the drivers of intergenerational mobility. Comparisons of the United States with many other countries might be interpreted as being policy irrelevant because the results may reflect differences in underlying values and social choices. A Canada-US comparison cannot be as easily dismissed.
The most important difference between Canadians and Americans has to do with their perspectives on the role of the government in supporting individuals and families in striving to realize their aspirations, Canadians being significantly more inclined to see government as a help rather than a hindrance. Progressive public policies are one factor promoting intergenerational mobility, but there are many others. These have to do with the strength and capacities of families to invest in the human capital of their children and to support them in all of the transitions they must make from infancy to adulthood, and with the structure of labor markets that reflect the economic returns to skills and education. Public policy, families, and labor markets all interact to determine differences in intergenerational mobility across space.
Our analysis of administrative data associated with the income tax records of the labor market outcomes of a cohort of Canadian men and women born in the early 1980s, a data set we construct to resemble that used by Chetty et al. (2014) for the United States, allows us to document the level and variation of intergenerational mobility across about 1,000 small areas that completely cover these two countries. This between and within country description shows considerable variation in outcomes within both countries, and we use unsupervised machine learning to cluster regions that are most similar across a battery of five related measures of mobility.
The findings support two broad descriptive conclusions that call for more detailed study. The first conclusion is that it is too simplistic to suggest that the international border is the most accurate way to understand the variation across these regions. Many areas in Canada share very high levels of intergenerational mobility with many areas in the United States. At the same time, some of the least mobile Canadian regions have more in common with the least mobile parts of the United States than they do with other parts of Canada. The second conclusion is that the Canada-US landscape can be best summarized as consisting of four broad regions, three of which the countries share, and one that is almost entirely American.
These findings in turn raise at least two issues that may help in understanding the underlying drivers of intergenerational mobility. One important reason that there is less intergenerational mobility in the United States has to do with the very low levels of mobility in the American South. While some parts of northern Canada share these challenges, they represent a much smaller fraction of the Canadian population. The US challenge may have to do with the longstanding issue of fully integrating the black population into the economic mainstream of cities and regions that have a long history of exclusion. As such, our findings echo existing research suggesting there is a much lower degree of mobility among the black population in the United States. The Canadian challenges may be just as important, but different in nature, more likely being associated with the Indigenous populations in some geographically more isolated areas of the country. There is no parallel in Canada for the magnitude of the experiences in the American South, which as Alesina and Glaeser (2004) stress is a central factor in understanding US-European differences in the nature and size of the welfare state. We suggest these same issues may be playing out in understanding the relatively low level of intergenerational mobility in the United States, and by implication the greater capacity for the Canadian welfare state to reduce poverty rates and lower inequality in the lower half of the income distribution.
Another reason there is more intergenerational mobility in Canada concerns a region of affluence but of low mobility that is distinct to the United States. Many regions along the Great Lakes and Northeastern seaboard of the United States are characterized by a relatively lower degree of mobility. They are not part of the Canadian landscape, with the great bulk of the Canadian population living in adjacent yet relatively more mobile communities. These Canadian communities are on average less affluent, but also characterized by less income inequality. This finding suggests that the search for causal explanations place less emphasis on inequalities in family life and private and public investments in education, and look more carefully at the structure of labor markets, the returns to human capital, and at income support to the least advantaged, an insight offered at one level by the Great Gatsby Curve. For example, Rothstein (2018) carefully mines the Commuting Zone data on relative rank mobility produced by Chetty et al. (2014) to show that parental influences on the educational attainment of their children may be second order in determining the degree of intergenerational mobility. His results emphasize the relatively strong role that variations in the returns to human capital across regions plays in determining the degree to which income is transmitted across the generations. Our findings also lean in this direction, suggesting an important role for labor market institutions, and the inequalities embedded in them, as a potential factor in understanding Canada-US differences.
The co-variates available in the data are limited to information reported for tax purposes, and include current marital status, language in which the tax filer completed his or her T1 form, the six-character alphanumeric postal code (in the year the child was linked to the parent), and a unique and confidential identifier for the partner. The T1 files also include all the income information available on the tax return: various income sources such as earnings, self-employment net income, interest and investment income, dividends, other employment income, rental income, and different government benefits. Detailed geographic information based on Census geographic coding is added to the individual records by Statistics Canada for the Census year closest to the year the parents and children are linked. For example, the postal codes from tax years 1997 through to 2001 can be linked to files containing information based on the 1996 Census geography, to the 2001 Census geography for the years 2002 to 2006. Individuals who immigrated to Canada after the age of 19 are not in scope, even if their later tax records are part of the T1 Family File. Also, while our analysis makes reference to "children and their parents," no biological link can be established, and "parent" should be understood in this sense.
Analytical Sample and Variable Definitions
Our analysis is based on an analytical file we create in order to make the data as comparable as possible to the core data sample used by Chetty et al. (2014) , defined as all children born in the 1980-1982 birth cohorts, for whom parents can be identified and whose mean parent income between 1996 and 2000 is no less than 500 US dollars. We select all children born in 1980 (coming from the 1996 cohort) and 1982 (coming from the 2001 cohort). Due to the age at which the children are matched to their parents (16 to 19 at the first year the match is attempted), and the tax years that are used to conduct the initial match (1996 and 2001) Parent income is defined as the five-year average of the total household income before taxes but after transfers, using the Canada Revenue Agency definition of total income. From 1982 onward this includes: Canada/Quebec Pension Plan benefits, capital gains/losses calculated, dividends (taxable grossed up), earnings from T4 slips including commissions, interest and investment income, Old Age Security pension, other employment income, other income, pension and superannuity income, rental income, self-employment net income (from business, commission, farming, fishing or professional), and employment insurance benefits. We use each parent's total income for the tax years 1996 to 2000, a potential of up to five years for each parent. If we cannot find a parent's tax record in a particular year, we assign a value of zero. We sum the father's and mother's total income and take the mean, that is, we add up all the income and divide by five.
Note that if the child is recorded as having two parents in the year linked, but if the parents separate or divorce at a later date we continue combining the individual incomes of the mother and father as defined in the year linked. Also, since the children born in 1982 are from the 2001 cohort, two "parents" can be identified in the year linked (2001 or later) but traced back in time even if they had not yet formed a household. Suppose a 2001-cohort child's mother and stepfather start filing taxes using the same address in 2000, then in 2001 they would both be considered the child's parents. This implies that in computing the mean parental income from 1996 to 2000, the mother and stepfather were actually not in the same household from 1996 to 1999. The descriptive statistics in the above table show that 76.8 percent of children grew up in households with married parents, 4.7 percent with common-law partners as parents, and the balance, 18.5 percent, with single parents. Our main parental income variable is based on a restriction of having an average income from 1996 to 2000 of US $500 or higher, which puts aside less than 1 percent of the sample. This is the average of total income including benefits, over five years, for one or two parents. Given the relatively more generous social safety net in Canada, ultra-low income situations are likely to be coding errors and not representative of a low-income situation, and excluding them is the reason for the cut-off.
Following Chetty et al. (2014) , we define child income as the mean of the child's total income for the tax years 2011 and 2012. If a spouse is reported, this includes the spouse's total income figures for the same years. If we cannot find a child in both the 2011 and the 2012 T1 files, meaning his or her income information is missing, we assign income a value of zero. This is done to be consistent with Chetty et al. (2014) . Just under 10 percent of children in the sample have an average income of US $500 or less (including those who were missing). We also defined a series of analytical samples based on assigning US $500 and US $1,000 to individuals reporting less than those amounts. Dollar figures in the original data files are expressed in Canadian current dollars, and we adjust for inflation by converting to 2012 Canadian constant dollars using the Consumer Price Index, based on the information reported by Statistics Canada. We then convert to 2012 US dollars using the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Purchasing Power Parity for private consumption for 2012, a value of $1.284164 Canadian for each US dollar. 25 Canadian children and their parents are assigned ranks in the US income distribution based on this PPP-converted total income. The online data appendix to Chetty et al. (2014) offers the national marginal income distributions by percentile as Table 2 . We use the midpoints between the mean parent and child incomes for each percentile of the respective income distributions rounded to the nearest 100 as our percentile cutoffs. 26 All relevant Canadian computations use are weighted, the weights taken as provided for children born in 1980, but rescaled for those born in 1982 to equal the sum of the 1980 weights. Our findings are not sensitive to this rescaling. The geographic coding is based on the postal code in the year linked, and the boundary definitions in the 1996 Census. Children born in 1980 and 1982 are in different IID cohorts and different years linked, meaning that their residence in their teen years would be closer to the 2001 Census than the 1996. We use the 1996 geography for all the observations in our analytical sample to avoid issues associated with boundary changes. The provincial and territorial boundaries do not change, apart from the creation of Nunavut in 1999. The Census Division is also a stable geographic unit during the time frame of our analysis. Census Divisions span the entire country, and reflect local and provincial administrative units, such as counties, regional districts, regional municipalities and other types of provincially legislated areas. There are 288 Census divisions in the 1996 and 2001 Census geographies. The following table shows the Census population estimates for Canadian Census Divisions and American Commuting Zones. The average Commuting Zone used by Chetty et al. (2014) has more than three times the population of the average Census Division, the total population of the United States being nine times that of Canada. There are roughly 2.5 times more Commuting Zones than Census Divisions. 
